

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00029 01 OF 02 050846Z

16

ACTION SS-25

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O P 050803Z FEB 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0821

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0029

EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: SPC TREATMENT OF AIR MANPOWER

REF: USNATO 0558

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE THAT SOME ASPECTS OF THE US PROPOSAL ON INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR REDUCTIONS AS PRESENTLY FORMULATED MAY BE CREATING UNNECESSARY DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ALLIES AND COULD ALSO DO SO WHEN ADVANCED TO THE EAST. THIS MESSAGE PROPOSES SOME FORMULATIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL MAKE THE US POSITION MORE SALEABLE. OUR SUGGESTIONS ARE: (A) TO ADVANCE TO THE EAST A FORMULA ON AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I WHICH WOULD SEEK TO ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT AGAINST OBLIGATORY AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS; AND (B) TO PROPOSE TO THE EAST THAT AIR MANPOWER BE INCLUDED ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS WITHIN THE PHASE I REDUCTIONS OF 29,000 US PERSONNEL AND 68,000 SOVIET PERSONNEL ALREADY PROPOSED, AND THAT AIR MANPOWER SHOULD NOT EXCEED 10 PERCENT OF THESE FIGURES. END SUMMARY.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00029 01 OF 02 050846Z

2. TO MAKE THE US PROPOSAL FOR INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER MORE SALEABLE BOTH TO THE ALLIES AND TO THE EAST, WE SUGGEST THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONSIDER CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS WHICH WOULD BETTER PROTECT IMPORTANT ALLIED INTERESTS AND WOULD AVOID INCREASING THE SIZE OF SOVIET REDUCTIONS SOUGHT IN PHASE I.

3. FIRST, WE COULD DEAL WITH ALLIED CONCERNS THAT INCLUSION OF US AIRMEN IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD SET A PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II BY MAKING IT MORE CLEAR THAT SUCH INCLUSION WOULD BE VOLUNTARY. THIS OBJECTIVE MIGHT BE MET BY ADVANCING A FORMULA TO THE EAST DESIGNED TO SET A PHASE I PRECEDENT AGAINST OBLIGATORY AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

4. EVEN WITH A WESTERN POSITION WHICH MADE CLEARER THAT INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS WOULD BE VOLUNTARY. SOME ALLIES MIGHT REMAIN APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE PRECEDENT-ESTABLISHING IMPLICATIONS OF THE FACT THAT THE US HAD INCLUDED AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS ON WHATEVER BASIS. THEREFORE, THE PROPOSED US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE OF SUCH LIMITED DIMENSIONS AS NOT TO CAUSE DIFFICULTY FOR THE ALLIES IN PHASE II, EVEN IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO PRESS FOR ALLIED AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS.

5. UP TO NOW, THE US HAS BEEN SUGGESTING THAT WE TELL THE EAST THAT IN PHASE I THE US AND SOVIET UNION WOULD EACH REDUCE 15 PCT OF THE TOTAL OF THEIR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND THAT THE US WOULD INCLUDE SOME AIR MANPOWER WITHIN THE OVERALL 15 PCT, THE EXACT AMOUNT TO BE DETERMINED LATER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PROPOSAL INCREASES THE US REDUCTIONS TO 34,050 AND THE SOVIET REDUCTIONS TO 81,600. IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONSENSUS IN WASHINGTON THAT IT WILL BE HARD ENOUGH TO GAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A 68,000 PHASE I REDUCTION, IT WOULD NOT SEEM PRACTICAL TO INCREASE OUR DEMANDS TO 81,000 (IN ADDITION TO THE ADDITIONAL 40,000 POLES AND CZECHS THE EAST WOULD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00029 01 OF 02 050846Z

HAVE TO REDUCE AS COMPARED TO THE PROPOSAL CURRENTLY ON THE TABLE IN VIENNA). TO MEET THE CURRENT PROBLEM WITH THE ALLIES, AND TO ANTICIPATE THE NEGOTIATING DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EAST WHICH WE FORESEE, THE DELEGATION PROPOSES THAT THE ALLIED PRESENTATION TO THE EAST PROVIDE THAT AIR MANPOWER SHOULD BE INCLUDED ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS WITHIN REPEAT WITHIN THE REDUCTIONS OF 29,000 US PERSONNEL AND 68,000

SOVIET PERSONNEL ALREADY PROPOSED, AND THAT AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS NOT EXCEED 10 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PHASE I REDUCTION. THAT IS, US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE 29,000 FIGURE, NOT ADDITIONAL TO IT; THE MAXIMUM SIZE OF THE US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTION WOULD BE 2,900 RATHER THAN 15 PERCENT OF TOTAL US AIR MANPOWER.

6. THIS APPROACH, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS IN CONFORMITY WITH HIGH-LEVEL US GUIDANCE ON INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I REDUCTIONS, WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES:

A. SHIFTING PROPOSED US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS TO A PERCENTAGE OF THE PRESENT REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL WILL SHOW THE ALLIES THAT EVEN IF THE VOLUNTARY REDUCTIONS APPROACH DOES NOT WORK AND A PRECEDENT FOR REDUCTION OF AIR MANPOWER IS IN FACT ESTABLISHED, IT WOULD BE ON SUCH A LIMITED BASIS THAT WHAT THEY WOULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE OUT IN PHASE II WOULD BE VERY SMALL. TOTAL NATO AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS UNDER THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 9,000 CALCULATING FROM A 900,000 COMMON CEILING AND APPLYING THE 10 PERCENT RULE TO THE TOTAL ALLIED REDUCTIONS OF 87,000 US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I WOULD

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00029 02 OF 02 050851Z

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0029

EXDIS NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

BE UNDER 3,000 AND UNDER 2,000 (10 PERCENT OF 20,000) IN PHASE II ASSUMING TOTAL US REDUCTIONS IN BOTH PHASES OF 50,000. TOTAL ALLIED AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II WOULD NOT EXCEED 4,000 MEN. THE ALLIES--WITH WHOM WE WOULD NOT WISH TO DISCUSS PHASE II DETAILS NOW--MIGHT ASSUME THAT THEIR PHASE II REDUCTIONS OF AIR MANPOWER WOULD TOTAL 6,000 RATHER THAN 4,000. EVEN SO, WE NOTE THAT THE FRG WHITE PAPER RECENTLY APPROVED BY THE BUNDESTAG PROVIDES IN ANY EVENT FOR A TRANSFER FROM ACTIVE DUTY OF 3,000 AIRMEN.

B. THE ALLIES CAN MAKE THIS CALCULATION WITHOUT EXHAUSTIVE STUDY. THROUGH CIVILIANIZATION AND RATIONALIZATION IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE THESE SMALL REDUCTIONS WITHOUT DECREASING THE NUMBER OF ALLIED AIRCRAFT.

C. THE PROPOSAL WOULD NOT ADD TO THE PRESENT ALLIED DEMANDS FOR SOVIET REDUCTIONS. WE COULD STILL COVER THE MANPOWER IN THE COMBAT ELEMENTS OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND INCLUDE SOME REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET AIR MANPOWER WITHIN THE 68,000
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00029 02 OF 02 050851Z

FIGURE WE HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED TO THE EAST. THE FIVE DIVISIONS INCLUDED IN WHAT IS THE LARGEST SOVIET TANK ARMY COMPRISE SOME 50,000 MEN. MANPOWER ABOVE THE DIVISION LEVEL INCLUDES A NUMBER OF SUPPORT UNITS FOR WHICH WE COULD ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO SUBSTITUTE AIRMEN.

D. THE PROPOSAL WOULD MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

E. AT THE SAME TIME, THE POSSIBLE PHASE I AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ON BOTH SIDES WOULD BE SO SMALL AS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY TO CHANGE THE AIR-GROUND FORCE RATION, IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD, AS WE WOULD HOPE, REDUCE ONLY GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. THUS, WE CAN AFFORD THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE.

7. THE FOLLOWING POINTS, DESIGNED WITH THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, MIGHT BE CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION IN NAC GUIDANCE AND FOR PRESENTATION TO THE EAST AS ONE PACKAGE:

A. THE ALLIES COULD OFFER TO PUT AIR MANPOWER

UNDER THE COMMON CEILING, CHANGING THE SUGGESTED
COMMON CEILING LEVEL TO 900,000 INSTEAD OF 700,000.

B. STATE THAT THE ALLIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE
CONCEPT THAT IT SHOULD BE OBLIGATORY FOR EVERY
DIRECT PARTICIPANT TO MAKE REDUCTION IN ITS AIR
MANPOWER.

C. SAY THAT, HOWEVER, THE ALLIES WOULD NOT
OBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT IT IS UP TO THE
INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANT TO DECIDE WHETHER TO
INCLUDE SOME AIR MANPOWER IN ITS REDUCTIONS.
IN NATO NOW AND SEPARATE THE ISSUE OF WHEN THE
NEW ALLIED PROPOSAL SHOULD BE ADVANCED IN ORDER
BOTH TO SIMPLIFY DISCUSSION OF THE US PROPOSAL
AND TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ADVANCING THE
AIR MANPOWER PROPOSAL INDEPENDENTLY IN THE PRESENT
ROUND.RESOR

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00029 02 OF 02 050851Z

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